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THE REGULATION OF EMPLOYMENT UNDER TITLE IXTHE PROPER SCOPE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY
INTRODUCTION

In 1972, Congress enacted the Higher Education AmendmentsI to
provide federal funds to institutions of higher learning 2 and to combat
sex discrimination at the elementary, secondary, and university
level.3 Section 901 of Title IX of the Amendments provides that
"[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving [f]ederal financial assistance."' Any federal department that
extends funds to a school district or university is directed to issue
regulations to effectuate the objectives of Title IX.' If a department
finds that a regulation has been violated, and the offending institution
refuses to alter the discriminatory practice voluntarily, the department can terminate or refuse to grant further federal funding."
In 1975, pursuant to the authority granted by Title LX, the Department of Health Education and Welfare (HEW) issued regulations1. Pub. L. No. 92-318, tit. IX, 86 Stat. 373 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-86
(1976) and in scattered sections of 29, 42 U.S.C.) The amendments provided nearly
$19 billion to post-secondary educational institutions. The legislation expanded assistance available to needy students and provided for money to be paid directly to the
institutions. 28 Cong. Q. Almanac 385-98 (1972).
2. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976).
3. Id.

4. Id. § 1681(9).
5. Id. § 1682. "Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to
extend Federal financial assistance to any education program or activity, by way of
grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty is authorized
and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 1681 of this title with respect to
such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with the achievement of the objectives of the statute
authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken." Id.
6. Id. "Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may
be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance
under such program or activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding. . . of a failure to comply with such requirement, but such
termination... shall be limited in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so found." Id. Although § 1682 also provides that enforcement may be obtained by "any other means authorized by law,"
id., the termination of federal funds, or the threat thereof, has been HEW's primary
tool in attempting to enforce the regulations. See, e.g., Romeo Community Schools
v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Junior College
Dist. v. Califano, 597 F.2d 119 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972
(1979).
7. See 45 C.F.R. § 86.21-.23 (1980). At the time the regulations were issued
and a majority of the cases were decided, HEW was responsible for the enforcement
of Title IX. On May 4, 1980, jurisdiction over educational matters was transferred to
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concerning many aspects of the operation of an educational institution, including admissions, 8 financial assistance, 9 choice of textbooks,"
and athletics.' At the same time, HEW interpreted the term "person" in section 901 to encompass employees. As a result of this interpretation, HEW issued Subpart E, which governs various employment practices of an educational institution that receives federal
funds. 12 The regulations apply to practices ranging from employee
recruitment to job classification and structure. 3 Furthermore, the
regulations are worded in such a way that their application is not
limited to those specific programs supported in whole or in part by
federal aid. Rather, they are applicable to all programs operated by
an educational facility that is the recipient of federal funds. 4
There has been considerable resistance to HEW's attempts to enforce these regulations. Local school districts and universities have
challenged HEW's authority to regulate employment under Title IX
and, until 1980, every circuit that considered the issue declared that
the regulations were invalid, concluding that Congress did not intend
Title IX to deal with employees.15 In 1980, however, the Second
Circuit held that HEW did not exceed its authority in issuing the
employment regulations. 6 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit declined to
the newly created Department of Education. The employment regulations have been
reissued by this department in the same form at 34 C.F.R. § 106.51 (1980). See also
45 Fed. Reg. 30802 (1980). In this Note, both departments will be referred to as
HEW.
8. 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.21-.23 (1980).
9. Id. § 86.37.

10. Id. § 86.42.
11. Id. § 86.41.
12. Id. §§ 86.51-.71.
13. Id.
14. Id. § 86.51(a). "No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination in employment, or recruitment, consideration, or selection therefor, whether full-time or parttime, under any education program or activity operated by a recipient which receives
or benefits from Federal financial assistance." Id.
15. Seattle Univ. v. HEW, 621 F.2d 992 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W,
3409 (U.S. Dec. 2, 1980) (No. 80-493); Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600
F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Junior College Dist. v. Callfano, 597 F.2d 119 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Islesboro School
Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Grove
City College v. Harris, 500 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. Pa. 1980); University of Toledo v.
HEW, 464 F. Supp. 693 (N.D. Ohio 1979); Hoth v. Grinnel, 23 FEP Cases (BNA)
528 (S.D. Iowa 1980); Board of Educ. v. HEW, 19 FEP Cases (BNA) 457 (N.D.
Ohio 1979). The District Court for Maine did, however, note that employment could
be regulated when the objective of a federal program is to provide employment,
Brunswick School Bd. v. Califano, 449 F. Supp. 866, 870 n.4 (D. Maine 1978), aff'd
sub nom. Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 426 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
16. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 786-87 (2d Cir.
1980), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3467 (U.S. Jan. 6, 1981) (No. 80-986).
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join the circuits that had found employees beyond the scope of Title
IX and declared that there could be circumstances when regulation of
employment would be permissible.1 7 The court held, however, that
the regulations as written went beyond the intent of Congress because they apply to all employment practices within an institution
receiving federal aid, rather than merely to those programs that receive federal funds. 8
HEW has contended that its interpretation of section 901 should
be given great weight. 9 Admittedly, it is a well established doctrine
of statutory construction that courts should regard the contemporaneous interpretation of a statute by an agency charged with its enforcement as persuasive." Nevertheless, an evaluation of an administrative act is dependent upon the extent to which a particular set of
regulations comports with legislative intent. Courts do not view
themselves as mere "rubber stamps" of an agency decision." An
agency interpretation that is inconsistent with the congressional policy underlying a statute will not be sustained.'
The validity of
HEW's position, therefore, is contingent upon the extent to which it
reflects the intent of Congress in enacting section 901.
This Note argues that the legislative history and a consideration of
other factors demonstrates that employees of educational institutions
are entitled to protection under Title IX. The regulations as written,
however, are invalid because Congress did not intend to draft a
general prohibition against sex discrimination in schools. Rather,
Congress sought to prevent the use of federal funds in support of
discriminatory practices in a recipient program or activity. This Note
contends, therefore, that the regulations should be rewritten to permit the termination of federal funding only when the funds are used
in support of discriminatory employment practices.

17. Dougherty County School Sys. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735, 736-37 (5th Cir.
1980), petitionfor cert. fded, 49 U.S.L.W. 3495 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1981) (No. 80-1023).
18. Id.
19. Brief for Appellants at 14, North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d
773 (2d Cir. 1980), petitionfor cert.filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3467 (U.S. Jan. 6, 1981) (No.
80-986).
20. United States v. Hammers, 221 U.S. 220, 225 (1911) C'Mhe rule often authoritatively announced is that 'where a court is doubtful about the meaning of an act
of Congress, the construction placed upon the act by the department charged with
its enforcement is in the highest degree persuasive if not controlling.' 7); see NLRB
v. Bell Aeorospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 274-75 (1974); Fawcus Mach. Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 375, 378 (1931).
21. NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291 (1965).
22. E.g., id.; Volkswagenwerk Ag. v. FMC, 390 U.S. 261, 272, modified, 392
U.S. 901 (1968). A court will also not allow an agency to "bootstrap itself into an area
in which it has no jurisdiction by repeatedly violating its statutory mandate." Federal
Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 745 (1973).
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A. Statutory Language
Whether employees come within the scope of Title IX is essentially
an issue of statutory construction. Therefore, the analysis must begin
with the language of the statute itself." HEW has contended that
the term "person" in section 901 ' is general enough to include employees of educational institutions among those who are "in a position
to 'be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under' such programs or activities." 2
Furthermore, it has stated that such an interpretation is supported by
the established practice of broadly construing civil rights acts to
effectuate their remedial purposes.6 A number of courts, however,
have rejected this interpretation.2 7 One has declared that such a
reading "does violence to the specific wording of the statute." Other
courts have viewed the statute as only protecting school children for
whom federally assisted education programs are established, or as
"on its face . . . aimed at ... students attending institutions receiving federal funds or teachers engaged in special research."-*
A similiar divergence of opinion concerning the appropriate interpretation of the "no person" language was generated by the wording
of the act on which Title IX was patterned, Section 601 of Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.31 To eliminate the confusion, Congress
added a provision specifically barring the application of Title VI to

23. 2A C. Sands, Sutherland's Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46.01 (3d
rev. ed. 1973).
24. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976).
25. Brief for Appellants at 14, North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d
773 (2d Cir. 1980), petitionfor cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3467 (U.S. Jan. 6, 1981) (No.
80-986).
26. See Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 307-08 (1969). Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer,
Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437 (1968); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966).
27. See e.g., Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581, 584 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Junior College Dist. v. Califano, 597 F.2d 119,
121 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 426 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
28. Brunswick School Bd. v. Califano, 449 F. Supp. 866, 870 (D. Maine 1978),
aff'd sub nom. Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
29. See Junior College Dist. v. Califano, 597 F.2d L19, 120-21 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); University of Toledo v. HEW, 464 F. Supp. 693, 696
(N.D. Ohio 1979).
30. Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 426 (1st Cir.) (emphasis
added), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976); see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.
677, 694-96 (1979).
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employment."2 Title IX contains no parallel provision. There are
nine other exemptions in Title IX, but none mentions employment in
any context.Y
An analysis of the failure to include employment as an exemption,

as well as an examination of the subjects that are exempted, has led
to both the inclusion and exclusion of employees from Title IX coverage. HEW views the absence of such a provision as an indication of
congressional intent to regulate employment.' The Sixth Circuit,
however, has taken the position that the failure to include such a
provision, coupled with the fact that most of the listed exemptions
relate to students, leads to the fair assumption that only students are
the subject of section 901.' Moreover, a number of courts have
reasoned that section 901 does not include an employment exemption
because such a provision would have been inconsistent with the portions of the proposal specifically amending employment related
statutes.
The statutory language is not conclusive as to whether employees
were intended to be within the scope of Title IX. There is ambiguity
concerning both the proper meaning to be given to the term "person" and the rationale behind the absence of an employment exclusion. Accordingly, an examination of the legislative history must be
made to resolve the conflict.

32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1976). For a discussion of the applicability of Title VI to
employment, see 110 Cong. Rec. 12484 (1964) (exchange between Reps. Pofl, Rodino, and McCulloch); id. at 12707 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). See generally
Kuhn, Title IX: Employment and Athletics Are Outside HEWs Jurisdiction, 65 Geo.
L.J. 49, 50-54 (1976).
33. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a)(1)-(9) (1976).
34. Brief for Appellants at 16, North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d
773 (2d Cir. 1980), petition for cert.filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3467 (U.S. Jan. 6, 1981) (No.
80-986). HEW also contends that the corollary to the principle of broad interpretation of civil rights legislation, see note 26 supra and accompanying text, that exemptions from such situations are to be narrowly drawn, see A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945), also supports their position. Brief for Appellants at 17.
35. Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581, 584 (6th Cir.), cei.
denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979). In North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d
773 (2d Cir. 1980), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3467 (U.S. Jan. 6. 1981) (No.
80-986), the court noted that although seven of the nine exemptions relate to student
matters such as admissions and extracurricular activities, two of the exceptions "do
not mention students at all, but rather exempt entire categories of institutions." Id.
at 778.
36. E.g., Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581, 584-85 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d
424, 427-28 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979). See generally Junior College
Dist. v. Califano, 597 F.2d 119 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979). The
statutes to which the courts referred were The Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)
(1976), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 41 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
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B. Legislative History of Section 901
1. The Impetus for Section 901
There were two reasons behind the perceived need for legislation
designed to prohibit sex discrimination in schools. The first concerned action taken by the women's movement to publicize the extent of sex discrimination in American education.' National attention
was focused on the problem in a series of congressional hearings held
in 1970.- In these hearings and in subsequent reports, 39 sex discrimination was found to exist in many areas, including admissions, 4" the
award of financial aid,' and placement.42 Employment discrimination
was found to be particularly acute.' Studies indicated that women
were hired less often than men and, when employed, were appointed
to less prestigious positions than men with equal qualifications."
Furthermore, it was demonstrated that female faculty members were
hired at lower salaries; subsequently, they lagged behind their male
counterparts in both salary increases and promotions.Y
The second factor was the lack of legal tools available to remedy
this situation.46 Although women had secured protection against
some employment discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 196447 and the Equal Pay Act of 1963,' these acts specifically exempted educational institutions from coverage. 4 As of 1971,
37. See Comment, HEW's Regulations Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972: Ultra Vires Challenges, 1976 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 133, 137 [hereinafter
cited as Ultra Vires Challenges].
38. See DiscriminationAgainst Women: Hearings on § 805 of H.R. 16098 Before
the Special Subcomm. on Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor,
91st Cong., 2d Sess., pts. 1 & 2 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Hearings].
39. For a summary of the testimony and evidence gathered at the hearings, see
Murray, Economic and Educational Inequality Based on Sex: An Overview, 5 Val.
U.L. Rev. 237, 247-70 (1971).
40. 1970 Hearings, supra note 38, at 643-47 (statement of Peter Muirhead).
41. See 118 Cong. Rec. 5808-09 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
42. Murray, supra note 39, at 257-58.
43. 1970 Hearings, supra note 38, at 196, 312 (report submitted by Dr. Ann
Scott). See generally Ultra Vires Challenges, supra note 37, at 141.
44. Robinson, Institutional Variation in the Status of Academic Women, in
Academic Women on the Move 199 (1973).
45. Morlock, Discipline Variation in the Status of Academic Woman, in Academic
Women on the Move 255, 277-81, 286-92 (1973); Robinson, supra note 44, at 214-23.
46. Ultra Vires Challenges, supra note 37, at 138-42.
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
49. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (1976). The original § 702 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 255, provided that "[t]his title shall not apply
to... an educational institution with respect to the employment of individuals to
perform work connected with the educational activities of such institution." Id. Section 214 of the Fair Labor Standards Act stated that § 206, the Equal Pay Act, did
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women 5odid not have statutory recourse to combat sex discrimination
in educational employment effectively.5
2. The Enactment of Section 901
In response to these problems, and as a general reaction to pressure from the women's movement, 2 a number of bills designed to
prohibit sex discrimination in educational facilities were introduced in
the early seventies. In August 1971, Senator Bayh proposed an
amendment to the pending Higher Education Act.0 The amendment
would have proscribed sex discrimination by educational institutions
that received federal financial assistance.m The amendment, hownot apply with respect to "any employee employed ... in the capacity of academic
administrative personnel or teacher in elementary or secondary schools." Fair Labor
Standard Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 214, 80 Stat. 837 (1966) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (1976)).
50. The hearings held in 1970, as well as the legislation eventually enacted, 20
U.S.C. § 1681 (1976), were concerned with sex discrimination against both students
and employees in educational institutions. This Note, however, will focus solely on
employment discrimination.
51. Ultra Vires Challenges, supra note 37, at 138. This is not to imply that
women were entirely without legal remedy. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 567
(1966), as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 684 (1966-70) (superseded
by Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 169 (1975)), barred sex discrimination by employers, including colleges and universities that held contracts with the federal government. Available sanctions under this executive order included allowing the
Secretary of Labor to publish the names of those who have failed to comply with the
order, Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 209(a)(1), 3 C.F.R. 570 (1966), and the termination
or suspension of a government contract with an offending party. Id., 3 C.F.R. 570

(1966). Although the means provided by the executive order are not ineffective in
combatting sex discrimination, the enforcement process is protracted, and the departments of Labor and HEW, charged with its enforcement, have not always been
active in pursuing complaints filed. Ultra Vires Challenges, supra note 37, at 139-40.
For a full discussion of the uses of Executive Order No. 11,246, see B. Babcock, A.
Freedman, E. Norton & S. Ross, Sex Discrimination and the Law 509-59 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as B. Babcock]. In 1972, a plaintiff alleging sex discrimination on
constitutional grounds had to demonstrate that the classification on the basis of sex
did not bear a "fair and substantial relation" to the goal of the conduct in question.
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). Subsequently, in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973), a plurality of the Court held that classification based on sex was
inherently suspect. Id. at 682. Since this decision, the Court has both upheld and
invalidated gender based classifications. Compare Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484
(1974) (upholding classification) with Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.
632 (1974) (invalidating classification). Presently, sex discrimination is not afforded
the strict judicial scrutiny reserved for suspect classes, although it may be "well on
the way toward becoming a suspect classification." See B. Schwartz, Constitutional
Law 391 (2d ed. 1979).
52. See generally 33 Cong. Q. 1484-85 (1975).
53. 117 Cong. Ree. 30155-58 (1971).
54. Id. at 30156. The amendment, No. 398, stated that '[n]o person in the
United States shall, on the ground of sex, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under any program or activity
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ever, never came to a vote.' In February 1972, Senator Bayh again
introduced on the floor of the Senate legislation designed to combat
sex discrimination in education. This amendment" 6 to the Higher
Education Act of 1972 incorporated most of the earlier proposal , and
also contained amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
19641 and the Equal Pay Act. 9 According to Senator Bayh, the purpose of this legislation was to close loopholes that existed in "education programs and [in] employment resulting from those
programs." 6° Section 901, the ban on sex discrimination in education
programs receiving federal funds, was declared to be "the heart of
[the] amendment," 6' and employment was specifically included as a
problem that this part of the proposal would confront. 62
Courts that have invalidated the regulations and have construed
the statute as applicable only to students have discounted the above
statements by concluding that Senator Bayh's introductory remarks
concerning employment discrimination were in reference to the parts

conducted by a public institution of higher education, or any school or department of
graduate education, which is a recipient of [flederal financial assistance for any
education program or activity." Id. Although the language of this first proposal differed slightly from that which was eventually enacted, the purpose was identical-to
prevent the use of federal funds in sexually discriminatory educational programs. The
remarks of Senator Bayh demonstrate that the protections embodied in this initial
amendment were intended to extend to faculty as well as students. He described the
barriers that women face when "seek[ing] admission and employment in educational
facilities." Id. at 30155 (remarks of Sen. Bayh). This amendment contained no provision to amend either the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976), or Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976). This indicates
that Senator Bayh intended the sanction of fund termination to be available in instances of employment discrimination. Any other interpretation would render his
extensive description of the "array of obstacles" facing women in academia pointless.
55. 117 Cong. Rec. 30412 (1971).
56. S. 874, 92 Cong., 1st Sess., 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972). The amendment
was divided into ten sections. The first outlined the general prohibition against the
use of federal funds in support of discriminatory programs. Id. § 1001(a), 118 Cong.
Rec. 5803 (1972) ("No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving (f]ederal financial
assistance."). Other sections outlined enforcement procedures, provided for judicial
review, and exempted financial assistance provided in the form of a contract of insurance or guaranty. The final sections brought educational institutions within the coverage of section 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and extended the Equal Pay Act to
include executive, administrative, and professional women. Id. §§ 1002-1010, 118
Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972).
57. See notes 53-55 supra and accompanying text.
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
60. 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh) (emphasis added).

61. Id.
62. Id. ("The amendment would cover such crucial aspects as admissions proce).
dures, scholarships, and faculty employment ....
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of his proposal amending Title VII and the Equal Pay Act.' A close
reading of these introductory remarks, however, demonstrates that
this interpretation is without merit. After outlining the "heart" of the
amendment, Senator Bayh noted that the enforcement powers in section 901 paralleled those in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1
Employment discrimination, therefore, was initially discussed in the
context of incorporating the funding termination provisions of Title VI
into section 901. Only subsequently did he discuss the "[o]ther important provisions" of his proposal, including the amendments to Title VII and the Equal Pay Act.6 There is no indication that these are
the only parts of the amendment in which the Senator intended to
deal with employment. Rather, it can be assumed that he regarded
the latter two proposals as additional tools with which to confront the
problem of sex discrimination.
The summary of the amendment published by Senator Bayh and
his responses to questions concerning the scope of its application
further demonstrate his intent to include employment within Title IX
coverage. 66 The summary begins with a statement that the first five
sections are central to the amendment., Because the fifth section of
the amendment refers to Title VII, some courts have taken this to be
an indication that Senator Bayh intended Title VII to deal with employment and that it was his oversight or confusion that led him to
include a discussion of employment in the funding termination
sections.' The remainder of the summary, however, undermines the
validity of this interpretation. In a specific reference to the Title IX
provisions governing the termination of federal funds, he stated that

63. Brunswick School Bd. v. Califano, 449 F. Supp. 866, 873 (S.D. Maine 1978),
aff'd sub nom. Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979). The court stated that "Senator Bayh's remarks [do not]
support [HEW's] position. Amendment 874, to which Senator Bayh referred, was the
original draft of Title IX, which included both § 901 and the Title VII and Equal Pay
Act amendments. It is apparent that his remarks, as well as his synopsis of Title LX,
insofar as they pertained to employment discrimination, can only reasonably be
understood as alluding to the Title VII and Equal Pay Act amendments, and not to §
901." Id.; accord, Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 438 F. Supp. 1021, 1030
(E.D. Mich. 1977), aff'd, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
64. 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh) (referring to Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (1976)).

65. Id.
66. Id. at 5807, 5812-13.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Junior College Dist. v. Califano, 597 F.2d 119, 121 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424,
427-28 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Romeo Community Schools v.
HEW, 438 F. Supp. 1021, 1030 (E.D. Mich. 1977), aff'd, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 49

[t]his portion of the amendment covers discrimination in all areas
where abuse has been mentioned-employment practices for
faculty and administrators ....

The provisions have been tested

under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act fbr the last [eight] years
so that we have evidence of their effectiveness and flexibility.'
Following this summary, Senator Bayh was specifically questioned
about the sections referring to the ban on federal support for sexually
discriminatory practices by educational institutions. 0 In response to
one question, he outlined the effect that these provisions would have
on the faculty of various types of schools.' If employees were to be
outside the ambit of this section of the amendment, it is likely that
Bayh would have so indicated and would not have explained the application of the section to the faculties of particular schools.
Further questions regarding those sections concerned whether
faculty of religious schools and military academies would come within
the scope of the amendment. In response, Senator Bayh stated that
both institutions would be exempt from the employee sex discrimination provision.7' This exchange is of particular significance because
neither Title VII nor the Equal Pay Act contain similiar funding termination provisions.73
69. 118 Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
70. Id. at 5812-13.
71. Id. The relevant portions of the exchange follow: "Mr. Pell.... Sections
1001 (a) and (b) include all educational institutions which receive [flederal assistance.
This includes elementary and secondary schools as well. With regard to private
undergraduate colleges, the Senator has excluded fiom coverage their admissions
practices. Does the same exclusion apply to nonpublic institutions at the elementary
and secondary level? Mr. Bayh. At the elementary and secondary levels, admissions
policies are not covered .... We are dealing with .. .discrimination in employment within an institution, as a member of a faculty or whatever. In the area of
employment we permit no exceptions .... Mr. Pell. Mr. President, do I understand the Senator to say that the faculty of private schools would have to reflect a
sexual balance? Mr. Bayh. This amendment sets no quotas. It only guarantees equality of opportunity .... [A]s far as employment opportunities are concerned, the
answer would be '[y]es.' Mr. Pell. The Senator means that a private school for
girls ... would have to accept men teachers, or vice versa? Mr. Bayh .... The
Senator is correct insofar as he is saying that discrimination on the basis of sex would
be forbidden." Id.
72. Id. at 5813. "Mr. Pell. Would this apply to a parochial school where they
have nuns as teachers? Mr. Bayh. No. There is an explicit exception for educational
institutions controlled by a religious organization .... Mr. Pell. [What about] Peekskill Military Institute which is [a military school] at the high school level. Would that
school be expected to have women teachers? .. .Mr. Bayh. All military schools are
excluded." Id.
73. Section 703(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976), does exempt an
employer from coverage when job classification on the basis of sex can be shown to
be a bona-fide occupational qualification "reasonably necessary to the normal operation" of a particular enterprise. Id. This is not, however, the same type of blanket
exemption for particular classes of educational institutions that Sen. Bayh included in
his second proposal.
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It is clear, therefore, that Senator Bayh, the sponsor of the bill,
intended section 901 to prohibit employee discrimination."' His
statements, although not controlling, 5 should be regarded as an
authoritative 76 guide to the interpretation of the section.In the House, two bills to eliminate sex discrimination were introduced. The Nixon administration sponsored a proposal that would
have banned sex discrimination in education programs receiving federal funds. -" This proposal, however, left a large loophole that per-

74. Any lingering doubts as to Senator Bayh's intention to bring employment
within the coverage of § 901 can be dispelled by an examination of a summary that
he published in the Congressional Record soon after the bill was signed by President
Nixon. In part, the summary stated that although "Title VI also specifically excludes
employment from coverage ....
[t]here is no similiar exemption for employment in
the sex discrimination provisions relating to federally assisted education programs."
118 Cong. Rec. 24684 n.1 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
75. Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 459-60 (1878). In evaluating the remarks of a
congressman, the context in which they were made is of considerable importance. In
general, statements made in the course of congressional debates "are not appropriate
sources of information from which to discover the meaning of the language of a
statute." United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 318 (1897).
See also United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 91 U.S. 72, 79 (1875). Justice Jackson
noted that courts should refuse to treat such statements as authoritative because they
are "casual statements.., not always distinguished for candor or accuracy." Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 396 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring). Similarly, the remarks of a legislator not a member of the committee that
considered a bill are not accorded much weight. See Duplex Printing Press Co. v.
Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 474 (1921) ('By repeated decisions of this court it has come
to be well established that the debates of Congress expressive of the views and motives of individual members are not a safe guide, and hence may not be resorted to,
in ascertaining the meaning and purpose of the law-making body."). See generally
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 318 (1897); United
States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 276-77 (1947). In contrast, statements by the author or
sponsor of a bill on the floor of Congress are given far greater weight. Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 562-64, 567-68 (1976);
Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1954); see United States v. Great N. Ry., 287
U.S. 144, 154-55 (1932); United States v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry., 247 U.S. 310, 318
(1918); United States v. Coca-Cola Co., 241 U.S. 265, 281-83 (1916); Pennsylvania
R.R. v. International Coal Mining Co., 230 U.S. 184, 198-99 (1913); Binns v. United
States, 194 U.S. 486, 495 (1904).
76. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1951).
"It is the sponsors that we look to when the meaning of the statutory words is in
doubt." Id. at 394-95; accord, NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 67-68 (1964); Wright v. Vinton Branch, 300 U.S. 440,
463-64 n.8 (1937); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 475 (1921);
Ideal Farms, Inc. v. Benson, 288 F.2d 608, 616 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 965 (1973).
77. See Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548,
564 (1976); Wright v. Vinton Branch, 300 U.S. 440, 463-64 n.8 (1937).
78. H.R. 5191, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1001 (b) (1971), reprinted in Ultra Vires
Challenges, supra note 37, at 142 n.35.
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mitted the sexes to be treated differently"' if a bona fide ground for

such treatment could be shown. The bill was strongly criticized and
was never adopted because the bona fide loophole would have en-

abled the intent of the proposal to be circumvented easily.'
At the same time, Representative Green of Oregon introduced a
bill that, like Senator Bayh's second proposal, prohibited sex discrimination in federally funded educational institutions. 8' It also included the amendments of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196482
and the Equal Pay Act. 3 This proposal, in the form eventually
adopted by the House, also included section 1004, a provision conspicuously absent from the Senate bill. 8' This section excluded employment practices from coverage except when the primary objective
of the federal financial assistance was to provide jobs.,' The language
of this section was taken directly from section 604 of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 While the Senate and House bills were in
79. Section 1001 (b) provided that "[n]o recipient of federal financial assistance
for an education program or activity shall, because of an individual's sex-(l) discharge that individual, fail or refuse to hire (except in instances where sex is a bona
fide occupational qualification) that individual, or otherwise discriminate against him
or her with respect to compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment,
or (2) limit, segregate, or classify employees in any way which would deprive or tend
to deprive that individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely effect
his or her status as an employee." Id. § 1001(b), reprinted in Ultra Vires Challenges,
supra note 37, at 142 n.35.

80. Ultra Vires Challenges, supra note 37, at 142.
81. H.R. 7248, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1001, 117 Cong. Rec. 39098-99 (1971).
82. Id. § 1006, 117 Cong Rec. 39099 (1971).
83. Id. § 1008-1009, 117 Cong. Rec. 39099 (1971). Only the amendment to tle
Equal Pay Act of 1963 was included as a part of Title IX of the Higher Education
Amendments of 1972 as finally enacted. Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 906 (b), 86 Stat. 375
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (1976)). The proposed amendment to Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act was enacted in another bill, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 3, 86 Stat. 103-04 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-1 (1976)).
84. See H.R. No. 884, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 108 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
House Report], reprinted in [1972] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2462, 2566.
85. Id., reprinted in [1972] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2566 ("[Nlothing in
this title may be taken to authorize action by any department or agency with respect
to any employment practice of any employer, employment agency, or labor organization except where a primary objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide
employment.").
86. Compare House Report, supra note 84, at 108, reprinted in [1972] U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2566 with 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1976). In the House
review of Representative Green's proposal, there was no specific discussion of §
1004. The only reference by the House to employees coming within the Act's coverage occurred in the discussion of an amendment to the Green proposal. In regard to
this amendment, Representative Smith of New York stated that "[this] amendment
would exempt out of this title all undergraduate schools and would leave the proluibition against sex discrimination to apply to graduate education and faculty employment and salaries." 117 Cong. Rec. 39255 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Smith). Such a
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the Conference Committee, section 1004 was deleted from the House
billy Specifically, the House "receded" from including the section
in the final draft.61 The House and Senate ultimately adopted the
Conference Committee version of the sex discrimination provisions as
Title IX of the Higher Education Amendments of 1972, and the bill
was signed into law by President Nixon."
The Conference Committee's deletion of section 1004 from the final version of the bill has been interpreted in a number of ways.
Courts that have excluded employees from section 901 have concluded that section 1004 was eliminated because such an employment

exclusion would have been inconsistent with the sections amending
Title VII and the Equal Pay Act.1 One commentator has regarded
its initial inclusion a "drafting mistake.""' The Second Circuit,
however, in North Haven Board of Education v. Hufstedler,92 has

found this theory to be unpersuasive because "Congress could easily
have drafted an employment exclusion [that would have been] applicable solely to the first portion of the Act," ' without affecting the
amendments of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act.
An analysis of "recede," as used in the Conference Committee report, supports the Second Circuit's position. In the context of congressional action, the term means "to withdraw opposition to an
amendment passed by the other house of a bicameral legislature.","
statement can be seen as indicative of House intent to include employees within
Title IX. This single statement was made, however, by a congressman who was
neither the sponsor of the bill nor involved in its drafting. It should not, therefore.
be given great weight. See note 75 supra.
87. Conference Rep. No. 798, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 2608, 2671-72.
88. Id., reprinted in [1972] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2671-72. The Conference Committee report stated that "[in addition, the House Amendment, but not
the Senate Amendment, provided that nothing in the title authorizes action by any
department... with respect to any employment practice of any employer .... The
House recedes." Id.
89. Higher Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, tit. IX, 86 Stat.
373 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-86 (1976) and in scattered sections of 29, 42
U.S.C.).
90. Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581, 584 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979). The court stated that "[t]he elimination of this language
[,the employment exclusion,] does not indicate that Title LX was intended to cover
employment practices. Rather it reflects the fact that at that point in the legislative
process such a provision ... would have been inaccurate and contradictory in light
of this statute's extension of existing laws to cover employment practices of educational institutions." Id. at 584; see Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d
424, 428 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
91. Kuhn, supra note 32, at 57.
92. 629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980), petition for cert. filed. 49 U.S. L.W. 3467 (U.S.
Jan. 6, 1981) (No. 80-986).
93. Id. at 783.
94. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1894 (1976 ed.)
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In Gulf Oil v. Copp Paving Co.,9 for example, the Supreme Court
refused to interpret a congressional act to include a provision that a

conference committee had specifically deleted. Referring to the deletion, it stated that such "action strongly militates against a judgment
that Congress intended a result it expressly declined to enact."'°
The House, therefbre, along with the Senate, did not intend to exclude employment practices from coverage when it enacted Title IX.
This conclusion is further supported by an examination of the congressional reaction to the Title IX regulations and the failure of subsequent attempts to amend section 901.
3. Subsequent Action by Congress
Congressional review of HEW's Title IX regulations, in the "laying
before procedure," 9 was conducted immediately following their
issuance in 1975.': During the forty-five day reviewing period, a

95. 419 U.S. 186 (1974).
96. Id. at 200; accord Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S.
384, 391-92 (1951) ("In view of th[e] history (of the bill and previous amendments]
we can only conclude that, if the draftsman intended (a particular result), It was
strange indeed that he omitted the one clear provision that would have accomplished
that result.").
97. Since 1938, a variety of statutes have included provisions designed to subject
administrative construction of regulations to congressional review. By means of this
procedure, termed a "laying before provision," Congress has a final opportunity to
correct administrative "errors and ambiguities [in] the law." H.R. Rep. No. 805, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 73, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4093, 4154.
The Title IX regulations were subjected to legislative scrutiny pursuant to 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232 (d)(1) (1976), which requires all regulations issued by agencies that receive
federal educational funds to submit administrative rulings for congressional review.
Commentators have viewed the laying before procedure as narrowing the role of
subsequent judicial review by creating a presumption in favor of congressional

approval, Note, "Laying on the Table"-A Device for Legislative Control over Delegated Powers, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 637, 647 (1952) [hereinafter Laying on the Table],
and perhaps, even eliminating it. Boisvert, A Legislative Tool for Supervision of
Administrative Agencies: The Laying System, 25 Fordham L. Rev. 638, 665 (1957)
("Such legislative participation in agency rule-making would ... eliminate in part
the possibility of future voiding of the regulation by the courts on an ultra vires
basis, since such laying could be interpreted as congressional approval of the agency
regulation."). The procedure has been the subject of controversy, with a number of
commentators challenging it on constitutional grounds. E.g., J. Harris, Congressional
Control of Administration 204-38 (1964); Cinnane, The Control of Federal Adminis-

tration by CongressionalResolutions and Committees, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 569, 593-99
(1953); Comment, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Ex-

ecutive, 63 Calif. L. Rev. 983, 1068-81 (1975). Another author, however, has argued
that the procedure is indeed valid. Schwartz, Legislative Control of Administrative

Rules and Regulations: 1. The American Experience, 30 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1031, 1042
(1955).
98. The regulations were published in the Federal Register on June 4, 1975. 40
Fed. Reg. 24127 (1975).

1981]

TITLE IX

759

number of resolutions challenging various aspects of the regulations
were introduced in both houses of Congress. In the Senate, a resolution disapproving of all regulations issued under Title IX, including
those relating to employment, was introduced.0 This resolution was
referred to the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
which took no action."° In the House, a resolution specifically disapproving of the employment regulations was drafted by Representatives Quie and Eilenborn.10 Like its Senate counterpart, this resolution died in committee.'02
HEW has argued that the failure of Congress to enact these resolutions excluding employees from coverage is demonstrative of support
for the inclusion of employees in section 901.111 One commentator,
however, has suggested that the length of time that elapsed between
the enactment of the original Title IX legislation and the reviewing
process should diminish the significance of the failure to disapprove 1o,
because many of those who reviewed the regulations had not been
members of Congress when Title IX was enacted and, therefore, had
no personal knowledge of the original congressional intent."c
Furthermore, it is argued that even those who had been present in 1971
would not remember the original intent because of the three year
delay."0 None of these criticisms, however, is relevant to the resolutions seeking to disapprove of the employment regulations. Senator
Bayh, in testimony before the committee considering the Quie/Eflenborn amendment, stated that he had intended Title IX to require
equality in educational employment.101 His testimony, therefore, was
available to jog dulled memories and enlighten the uninformed.
There are, however, factors that militate against viewing the result
of the laying before procedure as conclusive evidence of congressional
approval. First, because each resolution was referred to a committee
for action, few members of either house had an opportunity to hear
99. S. Con. Res. 46, 94th Cong., 1st Sess, 121 Cong. Rec. 17301 (1975).
100. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 783 (2d Cir. 1980),
petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3467 (U.S. Jan. 6, 1981) (No. 80-986).
101. Id. at 783-84 (citing Unpublished Amendment to H.R. Con. Res. 330, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (on file with the House Comm. on Education and Labor)).
102. Id. at 784.
103. Brief for Appellant at 33-35, North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629
F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3467 (U.S. Jan. 6.
1981) (No. 80-986).
104. Ultra Vires Challenges, supra note 37, at 156-57.
105. Id. at 156.
106. Id. at 157.
107. Sex DiscriminationRegulations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 173 (1975) (statement of Sen. Bayh) ("[T]itle IX guidelines, as the Congress
mandated, call for equality in... the case of teachers, and other educational personnel, employment, pay and promotions."). See generally 33 Cong. Q. 1484 (1975).
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Senator Bayh's statements or to vote on the merits of either the Senate or House resolution."° Second, the review was conducted in the
midst of substantial pressure by feminist lobbying groups. 09 Any
congressman considering disapproval of the regulations would have
been aware of the potential political impact of such a vote." Finally,
the statute requiring the legislative review of administrative regulations was amended, in November 1975, within six months after the
review of Title IX took place, to provide that failure to disapprove of
a set of regulations should not be construed as approval or as a finding of consistency with the authorizing statute."' Due to this amendment, the result of the laying before procedure cannot be viewed as
conclusively establishing congressional intent. Nevertheless, it does
provide "some evidence that coverage was intended." " Moreover,
it does not support the conclusion that Congress intended to exclude
employees from coverage.
Further support for the inclusion of employees within section 901
as written can be ascertained from the failure of subsequent congressional attempts to limit the scope of section 901. In 1975, Senator
Helms introduced a bill to amend Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972." 3 The relevant portion of the bill stated that
"[n]othing in [section 901] shall apply to any employees of any educational institution subject to this title." 14 The bill was never adopted.
A year later, Senator McClure proposed legislation that would have
limited the scope of section 901 to the "curriculum or graduate requirements of the institutions" receiving federal aid." 5 It would have
excluded employment, as well as scholarship aid and extracurricular
activities, from section 901.116 This bill was also never passed." 7 The
Supreme Court has stated that "the failure to amend [an act] in the
face of the consistent administrative construction, is ... persuasive of
legislative recognition and approval of the statute as construed.""'
This is especially true in instances of congressional inaction in the
face of specific attempts to amend." 9 In addition, the failure to
108. Ultra Vires Challenges, supra note 37, at 156.
109. 33 Cong. Q. 1484 (1975).
110. See id.
111. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d)(1) (1976).
112. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 784 (2d Cir. 1980),
petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3467 (U.S. Jan. 6, 1981) (No. 80-986).
113. S. 2146, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 Cong. Rec. 23845-47 (1975).
114. Id. § 2(2), 121 Cong. Rec. 23847 (1975).
115. Amend. No. 389 to S. 2657, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 122 Cong. Rec. 28136
(1976).
116. Id. § 178, 122 Cong. Rec. 28144 (1976).
117. 122 Cong. Rec. 28147 (1976).
118. McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U.S. 488, 492-93 (1931).
119. United States v. Bergh, 352 U.S. 40, 46-47 (1956) ("Several efforts were
made to repeal this [administrative] interpretation by specific Act of Congress, but in
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amend section 901 is significant
occasions, has amended Title IX
interpretation of the statute." conclusive, therefore, as to the
ployees within section 901.

because Congress, on two separate
when it has disagreed with HEW's
The complete legislative record is
intent of Congress to include em-

C. Title IX, Title VII and the Equal Pay Act
Some courts that have determined that employees are outside of
the scope of section 901 have concluded that Congress could not have
intended such a result when other remedies for employment discrimination are available 121under Title VII 1' and the Equal Pay
Act.'
They have implied that employees have no need for Title LX
because other acts fulfill the same purpose and provide adequate
remedies. Emphasizing that the termination of federal funds is the
primary remedy available to HEW, these courts have contended that
the application of such a sanction to employment discrimination is
illogical because it penalizes students in the enforcement of employees' rights. m
The contention that employees need not look to Title IX is without
merit for two reasons. First, the purpose of Title IX is distinct from
Title VII and the Equal Pay Act."i Title IX is intended "to avoid the

each instance the bill failed to pass.... [This] acquiescence of the Congress, must

be given great weight." (footnote omitted)); Alstate Constr. Co. v. Durkin, 345 U.S.
13, 17 (1953) ('We decline to repudiate an administrative interpretation of [an] [a]ct
which Congress refused to repudiate after being repeatedly urged to do so.*).
120. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 784 (2d Cir. 1980),
petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3467 (U.S. Jan. 6, 1981) (No. 80-986).
121. See, e.g., Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581, 584 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Califano, 19 FEP
Cases (BNA) 1505, 1507-08 (D. Conn. 1979), rev'd sub norn. North Haven Bd. of
Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980), petition for cert. filed, 49
U.S.L.W. 3467 (U.S. Jan. 6, 1981) (No. 80-986); Junior College Dist. v. Califano,
455 F. Supp. 1212, 1213-15 (E.D. Mo. 1978), aff'd, 597 F.2d 119 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
122. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
123. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
124. See, e.g., Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581, 584 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Califano, 19 FEP
Cases (BNA) 1505, 1507-08 (D. Conn. 1979), reo'd sub nom. North Haven Bd. of
Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980), petition for cert. filed, 49
U.S.L.W. 3467 (U.S. Jan. 6, 1981) (No. 80-986); Junior College Dist. v.Califano,
455 F. Supp. 1212, 1212-15 (E.D. Mo. 1978), aff'd, 597 F.2d 119 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
125. Admittedly, the same conduct could lead to charges of sex discrimination
against an educational employer under any or all of the three acts. A school district
that receives federal funds under 20 U.S.C. § 238 (1976), for example, can violate
Titles IX and VII, as well as the Equal Pay Act, if it pays female faculty members

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices." 16 The
focus, therefore, is on the ways in which federal aid is utilized. In
contrast, both the Equal Pay Act and Title VII focus on the barriers
encountered by women in the job market. The Equal Pay Act is designed as a "broad charter of women's rights in the economic
field." 17 Its goals are to equalize traditional differences in wages
paid to male and female workers and to alleviate the resulting
adverse economic and social consequences." 8 Title VII is a more
comprehensive prohibition against private acts of employment discrimination. "[T]o assure equality of employment opportunities,"'
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate not only
with respect to compensation, but to all the terms, privileges, and
conditions of employment."3

less than their male counterparts with equivalent professional credentials. As a resuit, the federal government may refuse, under Title IX, to continue to participate in
the program, or aggrieved parties may seek the remedies provided for in the other
two acts. That the three acts could be used in the same instance, however, should
not eliminate the availability of Title IX. In general, concurrent jurisdiction among
civil rights statutes has long been upheld. Courts have consistently held that
although Title VII was intended as a comprehensive solution for the problem of
employment discrimination, it was not intended to be the only avenue of relief available to an aggrieved individual. E.g., Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421
U.S. 454, 459 (1975) (" '[T]he remedies available to the individual under Title VII
are co-extensive with the individual's right to sue under the provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and .. . the two procedures augment each
other and are not mutually exclusive.' " (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 19 (1971))); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48 (1974) ("[T]hc
legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual
to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state
and federal statutes."); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 445 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (The failure of Congress to make 'Title VII the exclusive remedy for the
unlawful employment practices it covers .. . evince[s] a congressional purpose to

leave open other modes of relief available to victims of discriminatory employment
practices." (footnote omitted)), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978). Additionally, the
legislative history of Title VII indicates that Congress did not intend it to diminish
the usefulness of the Equal Pay Act as a remedy for employment discrimination. 118
Cong. Rec. 1677 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Williams) ("[I]t is not our intention in any
way to affect or diminish the remedies available under the Equal Pay Act of 1963.").
In fact, Congress has defeated amendments that would have made Title VII the
exclusive federal remedy for most unlawful employment practices in both 1964, 110
Cong. Rec. 13650-52 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Tower) and 1972. Joint Explanatory
Statement of Managers at Conference on H.R. 1746 to Further Promote Equal Employment Opportunitiesfor American Workers, [1972] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2179, 2183.
126. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979).
127. Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 905 (1970).
128. Id.
129. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976).
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Second, educational employees need the protection of Title IX because the extent and nature of its procedure and the ultimate remedy
it provides are clearly superior to those of Title VII and the Equal
Pay Act. Under Title IX, a person who believes himself to be the
subject of discrimination must file a complaint within 180 days.' 3 ,
HEW must conduct a "prompt investigation" 2 and, if a violation is
established, seek resolution by informal means.1
If this informal
procedure is unsuccessful, compliance can be effected by suspension
of or refusal to grant federal funds.'' This threat of the cutoff of
federal money has been termed "a powerful weapon" M and has been

praised for its "effectiveness and flexibility."1

Responsibility for the enforcement of Title VII rests with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which was created to
achieve the goals of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. ' An individual
who believes that her employer has violated Title VII must file a
charge with the EEOC, detailing the allegedly discriminatory
practice.138 If the complainant resides in a city or state that has
passed a fair employment practice law, the EEOC may not take action concerning the complaint for sixty days. Rather, it must allow
the local agency to attempt to resolve the dispute. in If no action has
been taken at the end of this waiting period, the EEOC must notify
the employer of the complaint and investigate the charges of
discrimination. 40
When a violation is found, the emphasis, as in Title IX, is on
"[c]ooperation and voluntary compliance" 4! rather than judicial

131. 45 C.F.R. § 80.7(b) (1980). HEW can also impose the "ultimate remedy"the termination of funds-if an educational institution fails
to comply with 45 C.F.R.

§ 86.4(a) (1980). This section requires every applicant for federal funds to submit an
assurance that the program will be operated in compliance with the regulations. Id.
132. Id. § 80.7(c).
133. Id. § 80.7(d).
134. Id. § 80.8(a). This is not to imply that funding can be terminated immediately
upon the finding of a violation. An order suspending the funds must be preceded by
a hearing in which an express finding of the violation is placed on the record, id. §
80.8(c)(2), and by the notification of the committee of each house of Congress having
jurisdiction over the program involved. Id. § 80.8(c)(3).
135. S. Ross, The Rights of Women 134 (1973).
136. 118 Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
137. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976); see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976).
139. Id. § 2000e-5(c); see New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 100 S.Ct. 2024,
2031 (1980) ("Initial resort to state and local remedies is mandated, and recourse to
the federal forums is appropriate only when the State does not provide prompt or
complete relief."). See also Moore v. Sunbeam Corp., 459 F.2d 811, 824 (7th Cir.
1972); EEOC v. Union Bank, 408 F.2d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 1968).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976).
141. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974).
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resolution. "Conference, conciliation, and persuasion" are required
before aggrieved parties can file a lawsuit.14 Unlike the Secretary of
HEW, however, the Commissioner of the EEOC has no direct powers of enforcement. He can neither adjudicate claims nor impose any
administrative sanctions.'4' If efforts to achieve conciliation fail, he
may bring a civil action against a non-governmental offender, 41 or in
the case of a governmental entity, refer the case to the Attorney
General, with whom the final decision to prosecute rests.14 Thus,
unlike the procedures under Title IX, which provide the administrative agency with the means to compel compliance, the procedures of
Title VII vest the courts with final enforcement responsibility.
Moreover, although the enforcement procedures provided for in
Title VII appear to provide an efficient means of resolving charges of
sex discrimination in employment, they have proven otherwise. The
EEOC has been confronted with an overload of cases,' and resolution of a claim under Title VII has been a lengthy process.147 Even
when a Title VII case reaches a federal court, it is unlikely that the
victim of sexually discriminatory practices will gain redress. First, it
is difficult to prove sex discrimination in an academic setting."'
Almost every female plaintiff who has brought allegations of Title VII
sex discrimination against a college or university has been
unsuccessful. 1 9 Second, courts have professed reluctance to inter142. Id.
143. Id.
144. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1976).
145. Id. Although it is true that Title VII also provides an individual with a private right of action, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976), this statute still forces a party to
go to court to ensure compliance. Under Title IX, compliance can be obtained without resort to judicial intervention.
146. It has been alleged that failure to provide support for the EEOC in the form
of funding is the cause of this delay. I. Murphy, Public Policy on the Status of
Women 39 (1973). In any case, statistics showed that as of June 30, 1972, 53,000
cases were awaiting resolution. Id. (citing EEOC Ann. Rep. (1972)).
147. It can be argued, however, that despite the possibility of delay, the remedies
provided for in Title VII make it a more attractive avenue of relief. The cutoff of
funds or the threat thereof is the primary sanction available under Title IX. See notes
5-6 supra and accompanying text. But see note 173 infra (discussion of fashioning
other remedies). Although the cutoff of funds results in the elimination of discrimination, it does not compensate an individual financially injured as a result of the violation. Title VII, on the other hand, is seemingly more economically beneficial to an
individual employee. Because the EEOC process and any ensuing litigation may drag
on for a number of years, however, it may be to an employee's economic advantage
to use the Title IX process, thus halting the discriminatory practice at an earlier
point and having her salary immediately increased, rather than using Title VII and
receiving the compensation many years later.
148. Sweeney v. Board of Trustees, 569 F.2d 169, 175 (1st Cir.), vacated and

remanded on other grounds per curiam, 439 U.S. 24 (1978).
149. See, e.g., Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977); Peters v. Middlebury College, 409 F. Supp. 857 (D. Vt.
1976); Van de Vate v. Boling, 379 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).
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vene in the employment decisions of a private university or
college m They have been hesitant to interject themselves in what
they view as subjective evaluations that would more appropriately be
made by persons in the academic setting.'
As one court has noted,
faculty appointments at a university level are poorly suited for federal
court supervision."
In contrast, if a Title IX complaint ultimately requires judicial
resolution, a court will be less hesitant to intervene because the discriminatory practice involves more than just the internal affairs of an
academic facility; it also involves the use of federal funds. The Supreme Court has expressed support for a national commitment to
eliminate sex discrimination 1 and the desire of Congress to prohibit
the use of federal funds in discriminatory ways.'5 It is likely, therefore, that the traditional judicial laissez-faire approach to academic
decision-making will give way to a commitment to eliminate governmental support of practices that offend the "moral sense of the
[Nation. " I-"
A comparison of Title IX and the Equal Pay Act also establishes
section 901 as a superior remedy. The Equal Pay Act has proven to
be an effective remedy" and the Department of Labor, unlike the
EEOC, has gained a reputation for prompt and effective processing of
complaints and efficient awarding of damages.'" Nevertheless, there
is a glaring deficiency in this act when compared %vith Title LX. The
Equal Pay Act can only remedy differences in compensation; any
other terms or conditions of employment are beyond its scope.I
Therefore, its usefulness as a tool in combatting employment discrimination in educational institutions is very limited.
150. Sweeney v. Board of Trustees, 569 F.2d 169, 176 & n.13 (1st Cir.). racated
and remanded on other grounds per curiam, 439 U.S. 24 (1978).
151. Id.; cf. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589. 603 (1967) (academic
freedom is a special concern of the first amendment), Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (essential to maintain academic freedom in universities). See
generally Murphy, Academic Freedom-An Emerging Constitutional Right. 28 Law
& Contemp. Prob. 447 (1963); Note, Academic Freedom and Federal Regulation of
University Hiring, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 879 (1979).
152. Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229, 1231-32 (2d Cir. 1974).
153. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430
U.S. 199 (1977); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
154. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703-04 (1979).
155. 110 Cong. Rec. 6544 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) (discussion of
rationale underlying Title VI).
156. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
157. I. Murphy, supra note 146, at 87. The Equal Pay Act requires employers to
pay equal salaries to a man and a woman when their jobs require "equal skill, effort,
and responsibility, and ... are performed under similar working conditions." 29
U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976). One court has held that the work need be only "substantially equal" to require equal pay. Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 266
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
158. I. Murphy, supra note 146, at 87.
159. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
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The analysis of the statutory language and the legislative history
have shown that Congress clearly intended employees to be within
the scope of section 901. Furthermore, section 901 provides employees of an educational institution with a means of combatting sex
discrimination unequalled in other statutes. It remains to be determined, however, whether HEW has exceeded its authority in issuing
the section 901 employment regulations.
II.

THE INVALIDITY OF THE REGULATIONS

UNDER SECTION 901

HEW has validly construed the "no person" language of section
901 to include the employees of an educational institution that receives federal financial assistance. It has, however, exceeded the
scope of its authority in its use of expansive language in the employment regulations. ' 60 The language of the regulations issued by HEW
differs from that of section 901 in two respects. First, it brings every
program of a recipient institution within the statute's coverage.'
The
statute, in contrast, is directed at the specific program that receives
the federal aid.1 62 Second, the language of the regulations allows
HEW to regulate a program that is a beneficiary, but not a recipient,
of the federal assistance.'

160. Some courts that have excluded employment coverage from 20 U.S.C. § 1681
(1976) have concluded that there is an implicit limitation on the power of HEW to
regulate under § 901 because 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976) (§ 902 of Title IX) permits
fund termination only in the particular portion of a program in which noncompliance
exists. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Califano, 19 FEP Cases (BNA) 1505, 1507-08
(D. Conn. 1979), rev'd sub nora. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d
773 (2d Cir. 1980), petitionfor cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3467 (U.S. Jan. 6, 1981) (No.
80-986); Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 438 F. Supp. 1021, 1033 (E.D. Mich.
1977), aff'd, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979). These courts
have concluded that, because employment practices are usually systemwide, employment regulations that would satisfy their interpretation of § 1681 could not be
drafted. These courts, therefore, did not reach the question whether regulations consistent with legislative intent could possibly be drawn. The Second Circuit, in North
Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980), petition for cert.
filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3467 (U.S. Jan. 6, 1981) (No. 80-986), accepted the present regulations as valid and therefore saw no need to suggest alternatives. Id. at 786. The
Fifth Circuit indicated that there are circumstances in which employment regulation
is warranted, but did not suggest specific reforms. Dougherty County School Sys. v.
Harris, 622 F.2d 735, 738 (5th Cir. 1980), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3945
(U.S. Jan. 22, 1981) (No. 80-1023).
161. 45 C.F.R. § 86.51(a)(1) (1980) ("No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination in employment, or recruitment, consideration, or selection therefore,
whether full-time or part-time, under any education program or activity operated by
a recipient which receives or benefits from (flederal financial assistance.").
162. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976).
163. 45 C.F.R. § 86.51(a) (1980).
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The validity of these regulations depends on the extent to which
they comply with the legislative purpose of section 901.'1" The Su-

preme Court has stated that the section was intended to prohibit the
use of federal funds in support of discriminatory practices in a recipient program or activity. ' Under a number of federal grant programs, the funds received directly support employment practices,

and therefore, regulation is valid. At the university level, for example, grants to develop programs to educate the elderly,M to establish
cooperative arrangements among universities,' 7 and to develop programs of combined academic study and employment,'1 all require

personnel to operate. At the local level, school districts have access to
federal grants to defray the costs of salaries in innovative educational
curriculums,'" programs for the education of the handicapped,"" and
local educational agencies serving areas with a high concentration of
children from low income families."' An employee who is victimized
by differential treatment on the basis of sex in any of these recipient
programs has been "subjected to discrimination under [an] education
program . . . receiving federal financial assistance" '- and is, therefore, deserving of Title IX protection.'"

164. See note 126 supra and accompanying text; note 174 infra and accompanying
text.
165. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979).
166. 20 U.S.C. § 1008a(a) (1976).
167. Id. § 1054(b)(1).
168. Id. § 1133.
169. Id. § 843(b)(2).
170. Id. § 2771 (Supp. II 1978).
171. Id. § 241(a) (1976).
172. Id. § 1681(a).
173. This potential termination of federal funds could be extremely burdensome
on a local school district in light of the current inflationary conditions, see generally
Wall St. J., March 4, 1981, at 3, cols. 2-3; id. March 3, 1981, at 2, col. 2, and the
enactment of state legislation significantly reducing local property taxes, see generally
N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1978, at 21, col. 4; id. June 9, 1978, at 1, col. 4, one of the
main sources of support for local school systems. See generally id. Jan. 14, 1979, §
XI, at 1, col. 1. As long as the wording of the statute remains as is, however, employees cannot justifiably be excluded on these grounds. There are two possible legislative solutions to this problem. First, Congress could add a provision similar to §
604 of Title VI, expressly excluding employees from coverage. As an alternative, far
less drastic measure, Congress could redraft the employment section utilizing the
statutory language that permits the HEW to employ "any other means authorized by
law," 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976), to effect compliance. Under such an amendment, the
HEW, by means of the conciliation procedures, would have to seek reinstatement
and backpay, as well as assurances that the practice will not be continued. The termination of funds would be employed only as a last resort. Because the Court has
held that Title IX contains an implied private right of action, Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), such a provision would be particularly useful to an
employee seeking redress without resort to administrative enforcement.
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When applied to programs that do not receive federal funds,
however, the regulations are invalid. Importantly, the legislative history indicates that Title IX was intended not as a general prohibition
against employment discrimination on the basis of sex within a recipient institution, but as a prohibition against federal support for
such discrimination.74 Consequently, regulation of non-recipient
programs is permissible only when federal funds flow from the recipient to the non-recipient programs. This occurs if, as a result of the
receipt of the federal funding, an institution reduces the expenditures
it makes in the recipient area and utilizes the "freed up" funds in
support of employment throughout the institution. An examination of
the effect on an institution's resources of the receipt of the funds
included within HEW's definition of " '[f]ederal financial
assistance,' "'75 however, reveals that in many cases there is little
connection between the funds received by one program and the resources available to others.
The federal grants included in the definition of federal financial
assistance can be categorized as indirect and direct. In the first category is aid that a school receives when a student who is the recipient
of government assistance makes a tuition payment. 76 One court has
held that a university that enrolls students who make federally
assisted tuition payments can become subject to regulation by HEW
solely on this basis."v Reliance on indirect student aid as the basis

174. The legislative history in this area is not very extensive. The available record,
however, militates against interpreting § 901 as a blanket prohibition against sex
discrimination by an educational employer. Congress had the opportunity but did not
enact legislation that would have provided for institution-wide coverage. In 1971 the
Nixon administration proposed a bill, H.R. 5191, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), that
prohibited sex discrimination in any program by a school that was a recipient of
federal financial assistance. Senator Bayh's first proposal, see notes 53-55 supra and
accompanying text, made such discrimination unlawful throughout an educational institution that received federal aid. Amendment 398 to S.659, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.,
117 Cong. Rec. 30155-57 (1971). The legislation as finally enacted adopted a far more
limited approach. It only permitted regulation within the particular program that
received the federal aid. See notes 2-4 supra and accompanying text; cf. Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 691-93 (1979) (In "drafting Title IX with an
unmistakable focus on the benefited class, [Congress has not] written it simply as a
ban on discriminatory conduct by recipients of federal funds or as a prohibition
against the disbursement of public funds to educational institutions engaged in discriminatory practices." (footnote omitted)).
175. 45 C.F.R. § 86.2(g) (1980) (emphasis deleted).
176. Id. § 86.2(g)(1)(ii).
177. Grove City College v. Harris, 500 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. Pa. 1980), Although
the court held that the receipt of such student funds was sufficient to make the
college a recipient, it refused to order the college to issue the requested assurances
of compliance because they were in reference to employment practices. In refusing,
it adopted the position of those courts that have found employees beyond the scope
of the statute. id. at 269; cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597, 602-03
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for classifying an institution as a recipient, however, has little support
in the legislative history. Although the record in this area is very
sparse, the available statements indicate that Senator Bayh never intended the curtailment of student assistance as a means of implementing Title IX's objectives."
Even if one assumes that a university is held to be a recipient
based on its use of indirect student aid, a link between the funds
received from the students and the regulated employment practices
must still be established.'- Within an educational institution it will
be difficult to demonstrate this link. In each case, HEW would have
to prove that the funds received by a university through federally
assisted tuition payments increased the resources it had at its disposal
to spend in an employment related context."O
Even when a university receives the federal funding directly,'"'
rather than through indirect payments, the necessary support, in a
number of instances, cannot be established. An examination of the
types of assistance received by both universities and local school districts indicates that there is often little, if any, flow of money from
supported to unsupported activities. With respect to universities,
many federal grant statutes contain provisions requiring a school to
continue funding programs that receive federal money at traditional
levels. 182 In such instances, the university receives no windfall prof-

(D.S.C. 1974) (all aid awarded to students by Veteran's Administration could be terminated due to university's failure to comply with Title VI regulations issued by that
agency), aff'd mem., 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975).
178. The only reference that the Senator made to the relationship between student aid and the termination of funding for a statutory violation took place in an
exchange concerning his 1971 proposal. He stated that "[i]t is unquestionable, in my
judgment, that [the termination provisions] would not be directed at specific assistance that was being received by individual students, but would be directed at the
institution." 117 Cong. Rec. 30408 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Bayh). If the Senator did
not view this as a permissible sanction in a proposal that made the receipt of federal
funds a sufficient basis for regulation throughout an institution, see note 54 supra and
accompanying text, it is highly unlikely that he would have seen it as appropriate in
the bill as passed, in which a nexus between the funds received and the program
sought to be regulated must be shown. See note 174 supra and accompanying text.
179. See note 174 supra and accompanying text.
180. A two step process is required to arrive at such a conclusion. First, the HEW
must show that students who are enrolled in a particular university receive federal
assistance and utilize it in making tuition payments. Second, the university, on the
basis of the receipt of these payments, must decrease its own expenditures for financial aid and concurrently increase the money it allocates for salaries or transfer it to a
general fund so that its use can be linked to employment practices.
181. 45 C.F.R. § 86.2(g)(1)-(5) (1980).
182. See 20 U.S.C. § 1022(1)(A)(B) (1976) (financial assistance for college library
programs may be obtained provided the institution provides assurances that the university, in the year federal aid is received, will allocate not less than the average
amount spent for the same purpose in the preceding two years). See also id. §§ 1023,
1070e(c)(A)(iii), 1124c, 1125(b)(5)(c), 1134s(c)(2)B (1976).
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its, nor does it suddenly discover a treasure trove that can be spread
among its various operating expenses. Rather, only the specifically
assisted federal program enjoys an increase in funds. At the
elementary and secondary school levels, the federal money often creates programs that otherwise might be non-existent.'
Because the
school district has made no expenditures in this area in the first
place, no funds are released to be used in support of other programs.
CONCLUSION

As presently written, the employment regulations conflict with the
language of section 901 and congressional intent. To resolve this conflict, HEW should reword the present regulations in one of two ways.
First, it can incorporate the statutory language and limit the scope of
the regulations to programs that are the recipients of federal funds.
Alternatively, if HEW desires to continue to regulate employment
practices in non-recipient programs, it must rewrite the regulations to
apply only when it can be demonstrated that such programs are supported by federal funds received elsewhere in the institution. Only
then will the regulations reflect congressional intent.

Catherine M. Kelly

183. See, e.g., id. §§ 841, 887(a), 900, 1531 (1976).

